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Prisoners, Punitive Damages, and
Precedent, Oh My! The Eleventh
Circuit in Hoever Overrules Prior
Interpretation of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act
Tatiana Dobretsova*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a prisoner at Dooly State Prison in Unadilla,
Georgia. A squad of about thirty officers march into the prison one day,
dressed in riot gear, chanting, “kill, kill, kill.”1 The officers begin
cursing and ordering inmates to get out of their cells, even yanking
some by their shirts if they are not moving quickly enough.2 As you and
the other inmates rush out of your cells, you are subjected to body
cavity searches—you are ordered to strip naked, squat and cough, turn

*To Professor Cathren Page, my faculty advisor, thank you for your advice, edits, and
guidance throughout this process. To Professors Linda Jellum and Timothy Floyd, thank
you for your notes, wisdom, and support. To my family, thank you for inspiring me and for
always believing in me. To my friends, thank you for making me laugh when times are
stressful. And to Amar Dhingra, my husband and brilliant partner, a special thank you
for your love, encouragement, support, and patience as I navigate law school.
1. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Harris v. Garner, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001) (No.
00-484), 2000 WL 34000105, at *3. The set of facts described in the Introduction occurred
during the prison shakedown that became the basis of Harris v. Garner, the first United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit opinion interpreting section 1997e(e) of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 1999), reh’g
en banc granted, vacated, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999), opinion reinstated in part on
reh’g, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000), overruled by Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d 1353 (11th
Cir. 2021). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2021).
2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 2000 WL 34000105, at *3. One such inmate, Willie
Hooks, was moving slowly because he had severe medical problems with his leg and back.
Because of this, he “was yanked by his shirt collar and pulled outside.” Id.
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around, and bend over, all in the presence of several officers.3 An officer
hands you a razor and forces you to dry shave.4 Meanwhile, officers are
yelling obscenities, pointing and laughing at you, and threatening you.5
You see inmates’ personal items and religious materials dumped on the
floor, thrown into toilets, and destroyed.6 You hear an officer yelling at
another inmate that if the inmate says anything about this incident, he
will be locked up and beaten until he does not “want to be gay
anymore.”7 Another inmate is ordered to hold his right foot in his left
hand, then to switch, and switch again quickly, while officers watch and
laugh at him.8
These shocking events did indeed occur at Dooley State Prison on
October 23, 1996, and were the premise of Harris v. Garner,9 the
Eleventh Circuit’s first opinion interpreting section 1997e(e) of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act.10 When the victims of this harassment
sought punitive damages, their claims were barred because they were
not able to meet section 1997e(e)’s physical injury requirement.11 Even
the victim who was forced to dry shave was deemed unable to meet the
physical injury requirement, and denied punitive damages.12
Enacted in 1996, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)13 was
designed to curtail meritless and frivolous prisoner claims in federal

3. Id. Officers also ordered prisoners to open their mouths, run their fingers through
their hair, lift their genitals, and “spread their buttocks so that their anuses were
exposed.” This all occurred in the presence of officers of the opposite sex, many of whom
whispered to each other, laughed, and pointed at the inmates. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at *3–4. This particular inmate, William Dailey, was ordered by two officers to
strip. The officers called Dailey “‘one of them fuck boys,’ and shoved him backwards to the
ground.” Officers conducted a body cavity search on Dailey, harassed and threatened him,
then told him if he said anything about the incident, “they would lock him up and ‘beat’
his ‘ass’ until he did not ‘want to be gay anymore.’” Half-naked and with his pants falling
down, Dailey was ordered to go downstairs, where he had to pass a group of women. Id.
8. Id. at *4. Samuel Locklear, while naked, was ordered to perform a “tap dance,”
where he had to repeatedly hold one foot and then quickly switch to the other for about a
minute. As he did this, two officers watched and laughed. Id. at *4, *12.
9. Harris, 190 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 1999), reh’g en banc granted, vacated, 197 F.3d
1059 (11th Cir. 1999), opinion reinstated in part on reh’g, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000),
overruled by Hoever, 993 F.3d 1353.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). See Hoever, 993 F.3d at 1362 (“This circuit’s first published
opinion to interpret § 1997e(e) was Harris”).
11. Harris, 190 F.3d at 1283.
12. Id. at 1287.
13. Pub. L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
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courts.14 One provision of the PLRA, section 1997e(e), “Limitation on
Recovery,” is of particular note.15 Until recently, the circuit courts were
split in their interpretation of section 1997e(e), disagreeing on whether
prisoners could seek punitive damages without showing physical
injury.16 The Eleventh Circuit was the last to assert that section
1997e(e) completely barred punitive damages absent physical injury;
however, in Hoever v. Marks,17 the Eleventh Circuit joined its sister
circuits, holding that section 1997e(e) does not necessarily bar punitive
damages without a showing of physical injury.18 Hoever significantly
impacts prisoners and correctional officers in the Eleventh Circuit and,
moving forward, will enable inmates to seek punitive damages without
a showing of physical injury.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The events leading up to Hoever started in 2013, when Conraad
Hoever was incarcerated at the Franklin Correctional Institution in
Carrabelle, Florida.19 In September 2013, proceeding pro se, Hoever
14. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1488 (11th Cir. 1997) (“After reviewing the
statutory framework of the PLRA, this court recently concluded that Congress
promulgated the Act to curtail abusive prisoner tort, civil rights and conditions
litigation.”).
15. In his concurrence and dissent, Judge Newsom called section 1997e(e) “a tough
nut to crack.” Hoever, 993 F.3d at 1365 (Newsom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
16. Chief Judge Pryor stated, “[o]ur circuit stands alone in enforcing § 1997e(e) as a
complete bar to punitive damages, no matter the substantive claim, in the absence of
physical injury.” Hoever, 993 F.3d at 1355. See also Carter v. Allen, 940 F.3d 1233, 1237
(11th Cir. 2019) (Martin, J., dissenting) (“In every other circuit, inmates can seek
compensatory damages or punitive damages or both for violations of their First
Amendment rights. Not so in the Eleventh Circuit.”).
17. 993 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2021).
18. Notably, in Davis v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the
PLRA limits punitive damages without a showing of physical injury. 158 F.3d 1342, 1348
(D.C. Cir. 1998). However, in Aref v. Lynch, the D.C. Circuit recognized an exception to
that rule and permitted both compensatory and punitive damages in cases involving a
First Amendment violation. 833 F.3d 242, 265–66 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“It is especially
difficult to see how violations of inmates’ First Amendment rights could ever be
vindicated, given the unlikelihood of physical harm in that context.”). Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit was the only circuit with a complete bar on punitive damages.
19. Hoever, 993 F.3d at 1355. In April 2010, Hoever was sentenced to fifteen years
imprisonment for lewd and lascivious molestation of a minor. Hoever v. Jones, No. 1462096-CIV, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194899, *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2015), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Hoever v. United States, No. 14-62096-CIV, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 194902 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2015). Hoever was a math teacher at Blanche Ely
High School in Florida. Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., Fla., 604 F.3d 1248, 1250 (11th
Cir. 2010). Prior to the sexual harassment of the fifteen-year-old student whose assault
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brought a 42 U.S.C. § 198320 action against four correctional officers,
alleging that his constitutional rights had been violated, and that he
was a victim of harassment and threats of physical violence.21 Hoever’s
complaint alleged that throughout the summer of 2013, in retaliation
for filing grievances and to discourage him from filing more grievances,
several correctional officers harassed and threatened him with physical
violence and death.22
The complaint alleged that on June 6, 2013, a correctional officer
threatened Hoever and other inmates with confinement or chemical
agents if they said anything improper against the officers.23 Hoever
claimed that on June 20, he was threatened by two officers, one of
whom stated: “If you keep on writing grievances, I promise you the next
11 years is [sic] going to be a heartache for you. You need to stop
writing grievances right now or we’ll make sure that you stop.”24 The
complaint also alleged that on July 20, another correctional officer told
Hoever never to write a grievance again, then threatened to starve
Hoever and spray him with chemicals every day if he continued to file
Hoever was convicted for, Hoever had molested at least two other female students. Id.
The fifteen-year-old student filed a federal lawsuit against the School Board of Broward
County, Florida and the former principal of the school, including a claim that the School
Board exhibited “deliberate indifference to known prior harassment by Hoever against
female students at Blanche Ely High School.” Id. at 1250, 1253. Apparently, despite a
record of complaints against Hoever, the former principal gave him a “satisfactory”
performance evaluation and even recommended that Hoever be retained for the following
school year. Id at 1253.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2021). Civil rights lawsuits are commonly brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, which holds liable any person who, “under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws.” Id. Notably, courts have stated the primary purpose of
enacting the PLRA was to curtail claims brought by prisoners under section 1983.
Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 1996), as amended (Nov. 14, 1996)
(“Congress enacted the PLRA primarily to curtail claims brought by prisoners under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Torts Claims Act, most of which concern prison conditions
and many of which are routinely dismissed as legally frivolous.”).
21. Hoever, 933 F.3d at 1355–56.
22. Hoever v. Carraway, 815 F. App’x 465, 465–66 (11th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc
granted, opinion vacated, 977 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2020), and on reh’g en banc sub nom.
Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2021) (hereinafter Carraway II).
23. Hoever v. Carraway, No. 4:13-cv549-MW-GRJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20661, at
*2 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2015), aff’d, 815 F. App’x 465 (11th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc
granted, opinion vacated, 977 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2020), and on reh’g en banc sub nom.
Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2021), and rev’d and remanded sub nom.
Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2021) (hereinafter Carraway I).
24. Carraway II, 815 F. App’x at 466.
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grievances.25 Allegedly, the officer warned Hoever that his next
grievance would be a “death sentence”—that the officer was part of a
prison gang and that the officer would have other inmates who worked
for the gang help kill Hoever.26 Despite these threats, Hoever wrote
another grievance to exhaust his remedies under the PLRA, which was
forwarded to the inspector’s office, marking the start of his legal battle
for retribution.27
Hoever’s complaint alleged claims for violations of his rights under
the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.28 He sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory
damages, and punitive damages.29 The district court dismissed Hoever’s
due process claim, the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, and
claims against the officers in their official capacities.30 Further, the
district court dismissed Hoever’s claims for punitive and compensatory
damages as barred by the PLRA, noting that while the PLRA permits
nominal damages if the violation of a constitutional right is established,
it “prohibit[s] a prisoner from bringing a federal civil action ‘for mental
or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of
physical injury.’”31 As Hoever did not sufficiently allege any physical
injury connected with his First Amendment claims, only his claim for
nominal damages for First Amendment violations proceeded to trial.32
During a three-day trial, the jury heard testimony about an occasion
in which an officer threatened, “‘[w]e’ve been killing inmates here for a
long time and nobody can do a damn thing to us,’ and a threat to ‘take
Hoever to confinement and starve him to death’ if he filed additional
grievances.”33 The jury found that Hoever’s First Amendment rights
were violated and awarded Hoever one dollar in nominal damages.34
Yes, one dollar.35 The officers appealed the judgment and Hoever
cross-appealed, challenging the dismissal of his punitive damages
claim.36 The panel for Hoever’s case followed Eleventh Circuit precedent
25. Carraway I, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20661, at *2.
26. Id. at *3.
27. Id.
28. Carraway II, 815 F. App’x at 466.
29. Id.
30. Hoever, 933 F.3d at 1356.
31. Carraway II, 815 F. App’x at 466 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)).
32. Hoever, 933 F.3d at 1356.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. With inflation, that is about $1.18. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2022).
36. Hoever, 933 F.3d at 1356.
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that interpreted the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e),37 as barring punitive
damages absent a showing of physical injury; however, the Eleventh
Circuit granted rehearing en banc to reconsider whether section
1997e(e) indeed bars punitive damages absent physical injury.38
Ultimately, joining the rest of its sister circuits,39 the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the PLRA permits claims for punitive
damages absent a showing of physical injury, reversed the district
court’s dismissal of Hoever’s First Amendment punitive damages claim,
and remanded the case for further proceedings.40

37. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
38. Hoever, 933 F.3d at 1356.
39. Kuperman v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69, 73, n.5 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that although the
PLRA was not discussed, it would not bar requests for nominal and punitive damages);
Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 416 (2d Cir. 2002) (concluding that section 1997e(e)
“does not restrict a plaintiff’s ability to recover compensatory damages for actual injury,
nominal or punitive damages, or injunctive and declaratory relief.”); Allah v. Al-Hafeez,
226 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that punitive damage claims stemming from
violation of First Amendment rights are not barred by section 1997e(e)); Wilcox v. Brown,
877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (agreeing that violations of First Amendment rights
“entitle a plaintiff to judicial relief wholly aside from any physical, mental, or emotional
injury” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hutchins v. McDaniels, 512 F.3d 193, 198
(5th Cir. 2007) (holding that PLRA does not bar nominal or punitive damages in the
absence of physical injury if prisoner can successfully prove violation of Fourth
Amendment rights); King v. Zamiara, 788 F.3d 207, 213 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he plain
language of [section 1997e(e)] does not bar claims for constitutional injury that do not also
involve physical injury”); Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781–82 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A
prisoner is entitled to judicial relief for a violation of his First Amendment rights aside
from any physical, mental, or emotional injury he may have sustained.”); Royal v.
Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that Congress “did not intend section
1997e(e) to bar recovery for all forms of relief” and agreeing that punitive damages are
available under the PLRA); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 630 (9th Cir. 2002) (“To the
extent that appellant has actionable claims for compensatory, nominal or punitive
damages—premised on violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, and not on any
alleged mental or emotional injuries—we conclude the claims are not barred by section
1997e(e).”); Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 880 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that
“punitive damages may be recovered for constitutional violations without a showing of
compensable injury.”).
40. Hoever, 933 F.3d at 1355–57.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Prison Litigation Reform Act
Until the 1960s, mostly due to the “hands-off doctrine,” it was
unclear whether prisoners had any constitutional rights.41 Under the
“hands-off doctrine,” judges abstained from considering what rights
prisoners had, as it was “not the function of the courts to superintend
the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries, but only to
deliver from imprisonment those who [were] illegally confined.”42
However, in the 1960s, prisoners’ rights law developed as numerous
lower court cases addressed prisoner petitions.43 Then, in 1974, the
United States Supreme Court validated prisoners’ rights, proclaiming
that, “[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the
prisons of this country.”44 Further, the Supreme Court announced that
“[w]hen a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental
constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to
protect constitutional rights.”45
By the 1990s, the number of prisoner suits had increased
considerably. Notably, this “explosion” of prisoners suing has been
argued to be a “half-truth”: there may have been an increase in the
absolute number of filings by prisoners, but the increase was possibly
due to the rapid growth in prison population.46 Further, the rate of
filings per 1000 inmates actually decreased 17% between 1980 and
1996.47 Nonetheless, there were growing concerns regarding the overall
rise in prisoner lawsuits—Congress found that the number of
complaints filed by prisoners had increased from 6,600 in 1975 to more

41. MICHAEL MUSHLIN, 1 RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 1:3. THE HANDS-OFF DOCTRINE (5th
ed. 2021). See also MICHAEL MUSHLIN, 1 RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 1:4. THE DEMISE OF THE
HANDS-OFF DOCTRINE AND THE BEGINNING OF PRISONERS’ RIGHTS LAW (5th ed. 2021).
42. Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851–52 (9th Cir. 1951).
43. MICHAEL MUSHLIN, 1 RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 1:4. THE DEMISE OF THE HANDS-OFF
DOCTRINE AND THE BEGINNING OF PRISONERS’ RIGHTS LAW (5th ed. 2021).
44. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974).
45. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405–06 (1974), overruled on other grounds by
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
46. James E. Robertson, Psychological Injury and the Prison Litigation Reform Act: A
“Not Exactly,” Equal Protection Analysis, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 105, 141–42 (2000).
47. Id. (citing JOHN SCALIA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PRISONER PETITIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 1980–96 at 5 (1997), available at
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppfc96.pdf (reporting that between 1980 and 1996, the
number of federal inmates increased from 23,779 to 95,088 and the number of state
inmates increased from 295,819 to 1,033,186)).
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than 39,000 in 1994.48 Reports showed that in 1995 over 25% of civil
cases filed in district courts were brought by prisoners.49 Thus, as an
effort to address this “rise” in prisoner lawsuits and to curtail the
increase of prisoner litigation in federal courts, Congress enacted the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996.50
The PLRA contains several provisions designed to reduce the
quantity of prisoner suits, including: a requirement to exhaust all
administrative remedies before filing a section 1983 civil rights
lawsuit;51 a restriction on attorney’s fees;52 and a requirement for courts
to weed out meritless claims.53 Among these provisions is section
1997e(e), which provides: “No Federal civil action may be brought by a
prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for
mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior
showing of physical injury.”54 This section, in particular, has caused a
circuit split and is the subject of Hoever v. Marks.
B. Eleventh Circuit’s Prior Interpretation of the PLRA
In 1999, the Eleventh Circuit published its first opinion interpreting
section 1997e(e), Harris v. Garner, holding that section 1997e(e) barred
punitive damages without a showing of physical injury.55 The details of
Harris, recounted with specificity in the Introduction, were harrowing.
In Harris, officers of the Georgia Department of Corrections, led by
Commissioner Wayne Garner, forced prisoners to strip naked,
performed body cavity searches in the presence of members of the
48. 141 CONG. REC. S14408-01 (1995) (“These suits can involve such grievances as
insufficient storage locker space, a defective haircut by a prison barber, the failure of
prison officials to invite a prisoner to a pizza party for a departing prison employee, and
yes, being served chunky peanut butter instead of the creamy variety. The list goes on
and on.”).
49. Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 1997).
50. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2021) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C.
1983), or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2) (2021) (“If the award of attorney’s fees is not greater than
150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.”).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) (2021) (“The court shall on its own motion or on the
motion of a party dismiss any action . . . if the court is satisfied that the action is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
55. Harris, 190 F.3d at 1287–88 (holding that section 1997e(e) did not bar declaratory
and injunctive relief but did bar compensatory and punitive damages).
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opposite sex, physically harassed inmates, ordered a prisoner to “dry
shave,” made inappropriate comments to a prisoner because of his
perceived sexual orientation, and ordered an inmate to “tap dance”
while naked.56 Eleven prisoners brought a civil rights suit for damages
and injunctive relief, alleging violations of their Fourth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.57
After holding that the stated injuries were not sufficient to meet the
physical injury requirement of section 1997e(e), the court concluded
that the PLRA bars actions for damages, but not for declaratory and
injunctive relief.58 In a brief paragraph addressing the language of
section 1997e(e), the court posited a temporal interpretation of the act.59
An action for money damages is the typical remedy for a violation of
rights that occurred in the past, so the past tense use of “suffer”
indicates that the provision creates a limitation only on a damages
remedy; however, declaratory and injunctive relief remain unimpaired
by the PLRA, since “the threat of imminent future harm can only be
cured by an equitable remedy.”60 Thus, the court held section 1997e(e)
precludes actions for money damages, such as punitive and
compensatory damages, but not actions for declaratory and injunctive
relief.61
Over the next several years, even though the court acknowledged
that a circuit split existed regarding the availability of punitive
damages under the PLRA, the court continued to follow its precedent
that the PLRA bars punitive damages without physical injury.62
C. Overruling Precedent
By the early 2000s, several circuit courts had held that punitive
damages could be recovered under section 1997e(e) absent a showing of

56. Id. at 1282.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1287–88. The court also considered the argument that barring claims not
involving physical injury is a denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment and
concluded that it does not violate due process. Id. at 1289.
59. Id. at 1287–88.
60. Id. at 1288.
61. Id.
62. Al-Amin v. Smith, 637 F.3d 1192, 1199, n.9 (11th Cir. 2011), overruled by Hoever
v. Marks, 993 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2021). The court even noted that “the overall tenor of
Harris and its progeny, when taken together, unmistakably supports this result.” Id. at
1199.
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physical injury.63 There was an emerging view that the plain language
of section 1997e(e) limits recovery “for mental and emotional injury”;
however, nominal and punitive damages should be unaffected, as they
seek to remedy a different type of injury.64 Notably, courts recognized
that making a showing of physical injury a prerequisite for filing any
civil rights lawsuits pertaining to mental or emotional injury “would
give officials free reign to maliciously and sadistically inflict
psychological torture on prisoners, so long as they [took] care not to
inflict any physical injury in the process.”65 This trend continued until
2017, at which point all circuits except the Eleventh agreed that the
PLRA does not necessarily bar punitive damages.66
The pressure on the Eleventh Circuit to reconsider its section
1997e(e) interpretation grew. In 2019, in Carter v. Allen,67 the court of
appeals was asked to rehear an appeal en banc to overrule Al-Amin.
The court of appeals declined to revisit its interpretation of section
1997e(e) for a “practical reason”: even if it did overrule Al-Amin, “it
would make no difference to Carter or to the judgment against his
claim.”68 In short, the case was not right for the punitive damages issue.
Judge Pryor explained that, though he “might be amenable to
reconsidering [the Eleventh Circuit’s] interpretation of section
1997e(e),” since the panel in this case concluded that Carter was not
entitled to a new trial, the punitive damages issue was irrelevant.69
Notably, in Carter, Judge Martin analyzed section 1997e(e) in her
dissent and concluded that punitive damages are not completely barred
by section 1997e(e) and that the Eleventh Circuit “interpreted the
PLRA to withdraw far more remedies from prisoners than Congress
required.”70 Disagreeing with the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of
the PLRA, Judge Martin stated, “our precedent leaves inmates with
nominal damages as their only remedy for violations of this bedrock
constitutional right, no matter how egregious the violation.”71
63. See cases cited supra note 39. See also, Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213
(9th Cir. 1998) (“ . . . § 1997e(e) does not apply to First Amendment Claims regardless of
the form of relief sought.”).
64. Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2003).
65. Id. at 940.
66. See cases cited supra note 39.
67. Carter v. Allen, 940 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2019).
68. Id. at 1234.
69. Id. at 1236. Chief Judge Pryor stated that though he was open to revisiting AlAmin and the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of the PLRA, he thought it was
“imprudent to do so . . . where the issue is as good as moot.” Id.
70. Id. at 1242 (Martin, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 1237.
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Interestingly, Judge Adalberto Jordan and Judge Jill Pryor agreed with
Judge William Pryor that Carter’s case was not a good one for en banc
review; however, in a footnote to the dissent, they agreed with Judge
Martin’s analysis of the statute and believed that the issues were
worthy of reconsideration by the Eleventh Circuit “in an appropriate
case.”72
Thus, in 2021, the Eleventh Circuit stood alone in enforcing the
PLRA as a complete bar to punitive damages absent a showing of
physical injury, making the Hoever opinion quite significant.73
Analyzing the text, purpose, and title of section 1997e(e), the court
ultimately held that the PLRA does not bar punitive damages absent
physical injury, and with comradely spirit, marked its union with its
sister circuits, citing various circuit cases as supporting sources.
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
A. The Majority Opinion – Chief Judge Pryor
Chief Judge Pryor’s majority opinion is divided into two parts: (1) an
analysis of why the PLRA permits punitive damages absent a showing
of physical injury, and (2) an explanation as to why the Eleventh
Circuit’s prior interpretation of the PLRA was incorrect.
1. The PLRA Permits Punitive Damages
Beginning with the language of the statute, Chief Judge Pryor
concluded that section 1997e(e)’s focus was on actions brought to
redress past injuries. The majority determined that the phrase
“[f]ederal civil action . . . brought . . . for . . . injury suffered” supported
the interpretation that section 1997e(e) addresses civil actions in which
plaintiffs seek to obtain redress.74 Emphasizing the word “for,” Chief
Judge Pryor discussed the implications of the word “for” when followed
by an object—in this case, a past injury.75 The majority noted that the
object that follows the word “for” informs what the action in section
1997e(e) is brought to accomplish, concluding that in this context, an
action would be brought to redress a past injury.76

72. Id. at 1237, n.1.
73. Hoever, 933 F.3d at 1355.
74. Id. at 1357. Chief Judge Pryor defined “civil action” from Black’s Law Dictionary
and noted that the past tense use of “suffer” demonstrates that the act “‘constitutes a
limitation on a damages remedy only.’” Id. (quoting Harris, 190 F.3d at 1288).
75. Id. at 1357–58.
76. Id. at 1358.
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Having determined that actions brought under section 1997e(e) are
to redress a past injury, the majority examined limitations addressed
within the act, concluding that the act bars compensatory damages. The
majority considered the phrase: “brought by a prisoner . . . for mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody.”77 As compensatory damages
are the only form of relief that redresses past mental or emotional
injury, Chief Judge Pryor held that section 1997e(e) bars compensatory
damages without a showing of physical injury.78 The majority further
held that the full phrase also indicates that the text of section 1997e(e)
bars claims for compensatory damages stemming from mental or
emotional harms.79
While the majority understood section 1997e(e) to bar compensatory
damages, it concluded that as punitive damages differ from
compensatory damages, the act does not bar punitive damages absent
physical injury. In his analysis, Chief Judge Pryor paid particular
attention to the diverging purposes of compensatory and punitive
damages, echoing the analysis of the Seventh Circuit in Calhoun v.
DeTella.80 The majority emphasized that while compensatory damages
are intended to compensate plaintiffs for injuries suffered, punitive
damages are intended to punish defendants for their willful or
malicious conduct and to deter others from similar behavior.81 Further,
while compensatory damages focus on the plaintiff’s injury or loss,
punitive damages focus on the character of the defendant’s conduct.82
Tying in its analysis of punitive damages with the previous discussion
of the word “for,” the majority concluded that “punitive damages are not
awarded to a plaintiff ‘for’ compensation of his mental or emotional
injury; they are imposed on a defendant ‘for’ deterrence and
punishment of his egregious misconduct.”83
Next, the majority focused on the act’s title, concluding that
Congress’ title choice also corroborates the interpretation of the PLRA
that it was not intended to bar punitive damages. The majority held
that section 1997e(e)’s title, “Limitation on Recovery,” strongly supports
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003)
and Akouri v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 408 F.3d 1338, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005)).
79. Id.
80. 319 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 2003). The facts of Calhoun are reminiscent of those in
Harris: an inmate was forced to undress in the presence of guards of the opposite sex,
laughed at, ridiculed, and subjected to a search. Id. at 938. In Calhoun; however, unlike in
Harris, punitive damages were not barred. Id. at 942.
81. Hoever, 933 F.3d at 1358–59.
82. Id. at 1359.
83. Id. at 1360.
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its reading of the act—the physical injury requirement is a limitation
on recovery, as opposed to a bar on suing, and the text limits prisoners
from recovering compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury
absent a showing of physical harm.84 Analyzing the word “recover” and
interpreting it to mean “to get or obtain again,” the majority concluded
that while compensatory damages restore plaintiffs to their pre-injury
position, punitive damages do not.85 This argument further affirmed the
interpretation that Congress did not intend the act to bar punitive
damages.
Finally, the majority compared nominal and punitive damages.
Nominal damages, like punitive damages, are not sought “for” mental
or emotional injury—they are “designed to vindicate the deprivation of
a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”86 Likewise, punitive damages may
also be recovered for constitutional violations absent physical injury.87
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals joined all other circuits in
holding that section 1997e(e) does not bar punitive damages without a
showing of physical injury.88
2. The Eleventh Circuit’s Prior Interpretation was Incorrect
The majority revisited three prior decisions interpreting section
1997e(e) to explain why its previous analysis was incorrect. First, the
majority examined Harris v. Garner, where it rejected a plaintiff’s
argument that the physical injury requirement denied him due
process.89 Chief Judge Pryor noted that in Harris, unlike in the present
case, the court failed to use a textualist approach to interpret the
phrase “action . . . brought . . . for mental or emotional injury
suffered.”90 Further, in Harris, the court focused on the act’s reference
to “physical injury” and did not consider how the phrase “for mental or
emotional injury” qualifies the scope of section 1997e(e)’s limitation on
recovery.91 By not considering the “for” phrase in Harris, the court
ultimately rendered the phrase “superfluous,” failing to give effect to
every word Congress used, thus misinterpreting Congressional intent.92
To further his point, Chief Judge Pryor compared section 1997e(e) to 28

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1361 (quoting Brooks v. Powell, 800 F.3d 1295, 1308 (11th Cir. 2015)).
Id. (quoting Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 880 (10th Cir. 2001)).
Id. at 1362.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1362–63.
Id. at 1363.
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U.S.C. § 1915(g),93 which contains a categorical requirement for
physical injury, demonstrating that Congress knows how to write a
categorical requirement when it wants to do so and chose not to write
one in section 1997e(e).94
Next, the majority briefly addressed Napier v. Preslicka,95 where
although punitive damages were not specifically discussed, the court
nonetheless ruled that the PLRA barred a punitive damages claim.96
The majority quickly moved on to Al-Amin v. Smith,97 where section
1997e(e) was again interpreted as barring punitive damages without a
showing of physical injury.98 The majority recognized that, “[b]ecause
[its] precedents did not grapple meaningfully with the text of
§ 1997e(e),” and, consequently, “foreclosed an important remedy
intended to punish and deter the intentional violation of the rights of
prisoners,” the precedents should be overruled.99
B. The Concurrence and Dissent in Part – Judge Newsom
Disagreeing with the majority on how to read the phrase “civil
action . . . brought . . . for mental or emotional injury suffered while in
custody,” Judge Newsom argued that section 1997e(e) does not
distinguish between different forms of monetary relief, only between
different forms of harm.100 Particularly for Judge Newsom, the relevant
question focused on the type of injury—specifically, whether a
prisoner’s action concerns “mental or emotional injury.”101 He
maintained that section 1997e(e) precludes prisoners from recovering
either compensatory or punitive damages without a showing of physical
injury; however, injuries that are not “mental or emotional” permit a
prisoner to seek both compensatory and punitive damages.102 Judge
Newsom divided his opinion into three parts: (1) an analysis of why
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (1996) (barring in forma pauperis actions brought by
prisoners with three strikes “unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious
physical injury.”).
94. Hoever, 933 F.3d at 1363.
95. 314 F.3d 528 (11th Cir. 2002).
96. Hoever, 933 F.3d at 1363.
97. 637 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2011).
98. Hoever, 933 F.3d at 1363.
99. Id. at 1363–64.
100. Id. at 1364 (Newsom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101. Id. Notably, the majority took issue with Judge Newsom’s use of the word
“concerns,” as opposed to “for,” stating that, “[a] ‘civil action . . . brought . . . for mental or
emotional injury suffered’ is an action brought for the purpose of remedying that injury,
not an action that merely ‘concerns’ the injury.” Id. at 1360–61 (majority opinion).
102. Id. (Newsom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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section 1997e(e) bars actions for mental or emotional injury without a
showing of physical injury, (2) a discussion about Hoever’s
“constitutional injury” argument, and (3) final thoughts on how he
would rule.
1. The PLRA Bars Actions “Concerning” Mental or Emotional
Injury
Picking apart the majority’s analysis, Judge Newsom engaged in a
semantic battle to ultimately conclude that the PLRA does bar punitive
damages. First, Judge Newsom disagreed with the majority’s
understanding of the word “for” within the act.103 He argued that the
majority’s definition was an “awkward fit,” and that a better option is to
interpret section 1997e(e)’s use of “for” to mean “concerning” or “with
respect to.”104 He asserted that this explanation of the word “for” yields
“natural and expected results” and, in fact, was how the court
interpreted the word previously.105 Concluding his discussion on the
word “for,” Judge Newsom asserted that section 1997e(e) should be
understood as: “If an inmate brings suit about—concerning—a mental
or emotional injury that he claims to have suffered while in custody, but
without showing any accompanying physical injury, his action is
barred.”106
Next, Judge Newsom disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that
punitive damages differ from compensatory damages. While he agreed
that “civil action” is a means of obtaining redress and that the
past-tense use of the word “suffer” indicates a request for damages,
Judge Newsom objected to majority’s suggestion that an action seeking
punitive damages is not a “civil action.”107 Further, Judge Newsom
disagreed with the majority’s assertion that section 1997e(e)’s physical
injury requirement applies to compensatory damages, but not to
103. Id. at 1366. Judge Newsom noted that while the majority relied on the Oxford
English Dictionary’s definition of the word “for,” the dictionary includes seventy-six
definitions of the word. Id. This does not seem like a successful argument for his point, as
the same could be said regarding his selected definition—why, out of all the definitions of
“for,” does he believe that his definition is better, especially when his definition leads to
the opposite conclusion that the rest of the circuit courts have reached regarding the
PLRA?
104. Id. Judge Newsom also asserted that the majority’s interpretation of the word
“for” leads to an “absurdity.” Id.
105. Id. at 1366–67. Judge Newsom argued that the previous interpretation of the
word “for” was “without apparent controversy.” Considering that several other circuits do
not interpret the word that way, it seems a far stretch to claim that no “apparent
controversy” existed.
106. Id. at 1366.
107. Id. at 1367.
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punitive damages.108 Primarily, Judge Newsom did not agree with the
majority’s distinction between punitive and compensatory damages,
arguing that both are to remedy harm suffered by the prisoner, thus
making the injury the reason both damages would be awarded.109
Notably, the majority refuted Judge Newsom’s argument that
punitive damages also “address an injury suffered.”110 Chief Judge
Pryor took issue with Judge Newsom’s justification for this argument,
noting that Judge Newsom not only ignored that punitive damages
punish defendants for their misconduct, but also cited to a dissenting
opinion by Justice Scalia that was not relevant to prisoners or the
PLRA.111 Further, Chief Judge Pryor emphasized that whether punitive
damages are sought in an action brought “for” an injury is a different
question than whether punitive damages were received “on account of”
an injury.112
Finally, Judge Newsom disagreed with the majority’s section
1997e(e) title analysis, asserting that the majority’s conclusion was too
narrow: just because punitive damages do not lead to a plaintiff
regaining or recovering anything, Judge Newsom argued, does not
mean that punitive damages do not fall under a title including
“recovery.”113 To support this conclusion, Judge Newsom pointed to
several statutes in which Congress referred to plaintiffs “recovering”
punitive damages, as well as cases that refer to plaintiffs “recovering”
punitive damages.114 Thus, Judge Newsom concluded, a statutory title
including the term “recovery” does not necessarily exclude punitive
damages and further, the language of section 1997e(e) does not indicate
an exclusion of punitive damages.115
In his opinion, Chief Judge Pryor also refuted Judge Newsom’s
argument regarding the word “recovery.” The majority noted that,
“[e]ven if courts and statutes are sometimes imprecise in referring to
the ‘recovery,’ instead of the awarding, of punitive damages, it is clear
108. Id. at 1367–68.
109. Id. at 1368.
110. Id. at 1360 (majority opinion).
111. Id. Oddly, not only did Judge Newsom extract language from a dissenting opinion
to support his argument, but the case itself, O’Gilvie v. United States, had nothing to do
with prisoners or the PLRA, and the Court ultimately held in O’Gilvie that punitive
damages are not received “on account of” personal injuries—the opposite point that Judge
Newsom is trying to make. 519 U.S. 79, 81 (1996).
112. Hoever, 933 F.3d at 1360.
113. Id. at 1368 (Newsom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114. Id. at 1368–69 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (2010); 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2020); 17
U.S.C. § 1332(b) (1998)).
115. Id. at 1369.
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that ‘recovery,’ in this context, refers to compensation because
§ 1997e(e) concerns an ‘injury suffered.’”116 Further, Chief Judge Pryor
questioned how Judge Newsom’s interpretation is not a bar to suing, as
opposed to a limitation on recovery or relief, as the title “Limitation on
Recovery” indicates.117
2. Hoever’s “Constitutional Injury” Argument Fails
Judge Newsom addressed Hoever’s alternative argument118 that,
even if section 1997e(e) bars punitive damages, it does not apply to his
First Amendment claims because it does not bar damages for
“constitutional injury.”119 While Judge Newsom initially agreed with
Hoever’s “constitutional injury” claim, he ultimately concluded that the
theory does not work.120 He conceded that there are injuries that do not
fall into the “physical” or “mental or emotional” categories, such as
economic injury, injuries to reputation, and injuries to property, among
others.121 However, as he did not agree with Hoever’s argument that
“constitutional injuries” are in a separate category from “mental and
emotional injuries,” Judge Newsom concluded that this theory was
invalid, and thus Hoever could not recover damages for “constitutional
injuries.”122
3. Judge Newsom’s Final Thoughts
Recounting the injuries alleged in Hoever’s complaint— “‘personal
humiliation,’ ‘mental anguish,’ ‘intimidation,’ ‘blemish to his prison
record,’ ‘impairment of his reputation,’ ‘defamation,’ and other
unspecified ‘irreparable harm’”—Judge Newsom concluded he would
hold that section 1997e(e) bars what he believed to be the “mental or
emotional injuries” in Hoever’s complaint: personal humiliation, mental

116. Id. at 1360 (majority opinion).
117. Id. at 1360–61.
118. Id. at 1370 (Newsom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority
opinion did not address Hoever’s argument in the alternative regarding “constitutional
injuries,” probably because it was not necessary, as punitive damages without a showing
of physical injury were held to not be barred by the PLRA.
119. Id. at 1369–70.
120. Id. at 1370.
121. Id. (quoting THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
§ 39, at 45 (9th ed. 1920)).
122. Id. at 1371. Then, Judge Newsom analyzed the word “injury” and how it should
be understood in the context of statutes. Id. at 1371–72.
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anguish, and intimidation.123 He believed that a suit alleging injuries
based on blemish to prison record, impairment of reputation, and
defamation however, would fall outside of section 1997e(e)’s scope, and
thus not bar any damages sought.124 In conclusion, Judge Newsom
would hold that the phrase “civil action . . . brought . . . for mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody” distinguishes between
categories of injury, as opposed to categories of damages.125 In the
majority opinion, Chief Judge Pryor refuted Judge Newsom’s
arguments and questioned how Judge Newsom divided the categories of
injuries when they were all based on the same willful misconduct of the
defendant—something that punitive damages are intended to punish.126
V. IMPLICATIONS
The decision in Hoever marks the Eleventh Circuit’s union with all
other circuits in recognizing the importance of punishing and deterring
the intentional violation of prisoners’ First Amendment rights,
concluding that section 1997e(e) permits claims for punitive damages
without a showing of physical injury.127 With this decision, the Eleventh
Circuit validates the important right for prisoners to seek punitive
remedies for wrongful conduct and, hopefully, will deter future
malicious behavior toward prisoners. Although violations of First
Amendment rights are rarely accompanied by physical injury, victims of
such violations suffer substantial harm and now may be entitled to
receive punitive damages.128 The consequences of barring punitive
damages for constitutional violations are grave, as this would afford

123. Id. at 1373. Notably, Judge Newsom gave no explanation as to why he deems
personal humiliation, mental anguish, and intimidation as mental or emotional injuries.
Is he proposing a test based on the judge’s subjective opinion?
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1374. Judge Newsom’s analysis is similar to that in Aref v. Lynch; however,
in Aref, the D.C. Circuit ultimately concluded that prisoners may seek compensatory,
punitive, and nominal damages if they assert First Amendment-related complaints. 833
F.3d 242, 263, 267 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Judge Newsom, on the other hand, would interpret
section 1997(e) as barring any damages concerning mental or emotional injuries. Hoever,
933 F.3d at 1374 (Newsom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126. Id. at 1362 (majority opinion).
127. Id. at 1364.
128. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of
Georgia, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant at 1–2, Hoever v.
Marks,
933
F.3d
1353
(11th
Cir.
2021)
(No.
17-10792),
https://americansforprosperity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/2020-12-02-Motion-withattached-Amici-Curiae-Brief.pdf. (last visited April 13, 2022).
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“virtual immunity” for correctional officers to commit such violations, as
long as no physical injury is sustained.129
The PLRA already contains measures to curtail frivolous lawsuits, so
there is no indication that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to overrule its
precedent in Hoever would open the floodgates.130 Further, this
interpretation of the PLRA is more reasonably consistent with
congressional intent, considering that the term “punitive damages” does
not appear at all in the PLRA or in any draft of the act.131 As Judge
Martin asserted in her dissent in Carter, until the Eleventh Circuit
reversed Al-Amin, it would allow the court to “deny inmates relief that
Congress did not intend to preclude.”132 In Hoever’s en banc reply brief,
counsel noted that, “in reams of legislative history spanning 896 pages,
the term ‘punitive damages’ comes up exactly once, in passing, buried in
an anecdote in an op-ed that happened to be placed into the
Congressional Record.”133 With the court’s decision in Hoever, the
Eleventh Circuit aligns itself with the text of the PLRA and no longer
denies remedies from prisoners that Congress never intended to
remove.
Going forward, prisoners in the Eleventh Circuit can seek punitive
damages for claims such as racial discrimination and psychological
torture without having to show physical injury. This remedy should
empower victims of such injustices to sue their abusers, holding
malicious correctional officers accountable for their behavior and
hopefully deterring similar conduct. Perhaps the Hoever decision will
encourage wardens to implement training programs to educate prison
staff on the effects of egregious conduct directed toward inmates. While
this potential impact may be wishful thinking, this decision undeniably
moves in the right direction to recognizing and validating victims of
mental and emotional abuse.

129. Id. at 3–4.
130. Id. at 5–6 (stating that, “In circuits that have considered the issue, the number of
‘civil rights’ and ‘prison conditions’ cases filed by prisoners continues to fluctuate over
time . . . . there is no association between a Circuit court’s decision regarding availability
of punitive damages for constitutional claims without physical injury and the subsequent
number of prisoner lawsuits filed. Simply put, there is no reason to suspect a sudden flood
of litigation if this Circuit were to correct course and join the majority of other circuits.”).
131. Cross-Appellant Hoever’s En Banc Reply Brief at 3, Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d
1353 (11th Cir. 2021) (No. 17-10792) (citing 141 CONG. REC. S7,527 (1995)).
132. Carter, 940 F.3d at 1237 (Martin, J., dissenting).
133. Cross-Appellant Hoever’s En Banc Reply Brief at 3.

